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A Call to Action:
A Client-Centered Evaluation of
Collaborative Law
Alexandria ZyIstra, J.D., LL.M.*
In the spring of 2005, I attended my second informational session on the
topic of collaborative law at the annual conference of the Association of
Family and Conciliation Courts. Toward the end of the session, as the
question and answer period began, I wrote on my notepad: "If it is not
discovered until long into the collaborative process that litigation is
appropriate,haven't you eliminated the client's BA TNA [Best Alternative to

a Negotiated Agreement]?" During the intervening years, I have posed this
question to many collaborative law advocates, but never felt my question
was answered sufficiently. The most common answer tended to center on
risk analysis. That is, the small risk of eliminating a client's right to use this
lawyer for litigation is far outweighed by the benefit of avoiding the
negative effects of traditional litigation.
While clearly a sound, logical answer, I continued to wonder whether
clients would see collaborative law in this light. It was that scribbled note
that led me to this current investigation into collaborative law literature to
determine whether evidence has, in fact, established that clients benefit from
eliminating the ability of counsel to pursue litigation, particularly in the
family law setting. This paper will first examine the process of collaborative
law, from deciding to hire a collaborative lawyer to the disqualification
agreement, as well as identifying potential dangers for the client, including
an analysis of collaborative law utilizing the negotiation theory of Roger
Fisher and William Ury's book Getting to Yes. The second part of the paper
will examine how collaborative law literature evaluates and critiques the
costs and benefits of collaborative law. This paper ultimately finds that the
cost-benefit analysis either stems from small, non-controlled studies or
personal anecdotes, or discussions of whether collaborative law complies
with ethics rules, both of which are practitioner-centered.
* Alexandria Zylstra is an Associate Professor of Legal Studies at Stephens College. She earned her
J.D. and LL.M. in Dispute Resolution from the University of Missouri-Columbia, and has published
several articles concerning family law issues.
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The conclusion I reach from this analysis is two-fold. First, despite two
decades of collaborative law, there is still no research by disinterested
examiners utilizing control (or at least comparison) groups evaluating the
benefits and costs of collaborative law as compared to other family dispute
resolution methods: mediation, negotiated settlement, or litigation. Given
this paucity of evidence, I am not suggesting collaborative law should be
abandoned, or even discouraged, but simply that it should not be advocated
with the zealous fervor it seems to receive by many advocates until solid
research, such as that which came out of the mediation movement, actually
establishes client benefits. Secondly, lawyers choosing to offer collaborative
law to clients should, at least, be aware of the ethical pitfalls already
identified in those few studies that have been conducted, and should evaluate
whether they are really advocating collaborative law because it is in the
client's best interest (based on verifiable evidence), or out of a personal
choice of practice style. Addressing this issue is even more urgent given
that the Uniform Law Commission plans to present the recently revised (and
re-named) Uniform Collaborative Law Rules and Act to the American Bar
Association's House of Delegates later this summer.'
I.

THE COLLABORATIVE LAW PROCESS

Collaborative law (CL) has spread across the United States and Canada
in the past twenty years, and most practitioners (and clients) are
concentrated in the field of family law.2 In a typical collaborative case,
divorcing spouses each hire separate legal counsel, both of whom agree to
limited representation.3 That is, the attorneys and parties sign an agreement,
sometimes called a participation agreement or disqualification agreement, to
settle the divorce issues solely through cooperative negotiation and without
litigation.4 No court filings are made until the collaborative law process
settles all legal issues.' Should either party decide to litigate, or even
threaten litigation, both collaborative lawyers (and all other hired
professionals) are disqualified, and both parties must hire new counsel and
new professionals. 6 It is this disqualification provision that defines

1.

UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW R. & UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT (amended 2010),

available at http://www.1aw.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucla/2010_final.htm.
2. Pauline H. Tesler, CollaborativeFamily Law, 4 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 317 (2004).
3. PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN
DIVORCE WiTHouT LITIGATION 3, 4 (2d ed. 2008).

4.

Id at7.

5.

See generally id. at 69 (describing the end stage of collaborative law representation).

6.

Id at3-4.
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collaborative law. It is the "one irreducible minimum condition" for CL.
CL advocates argue that the disqualification agreement, by closing the door
to the courthouse, shifts negotiations toward settlement and away from legal
gamesmanship.8 The CL agreement signed by parties and attorneys
generally requires, upon punishment of withdrawal, good-faith negotiation,
and full and voluntary discovery.9 Most of the work of CL is done in fourway meetings in which clients and attorneys actively participate.'o Thus, the
goal of CL is interest-based negotiations involving the dynamic participation
of both legal counsel and parties that result in finding "common ground for
solutions" without the threat of litigation looming over them."
Collaborative law is the brainchild of Stu Webb, a Minnesota family
lawyer who, after practicing traditional family law for nearly two decades,
was "approaching burn-out" in the late 1980s.12 "I had come to hate the
adversarial nature of my practice and hated to go to work. It was becoming
harder and harder to tolerate family practice. Incivility seemed on the
increase rather than the decrease." 3 Webb began experimenting with
different methods of conflict resolution for divorce issues until finding that
the "most promising model" was attorney as settlement lawyer, meaning one
who would withdraw from the case if settlement could not be reached:14 ,1
saw the possibility of creating a settlement specialty bar consisting of
lawyers who would take cases only for settlement."
Webb's concerns about adversarial litigation are not unique. Extensive
literature paints a picture of traditional litigation as "dominated by hard-line
positions reflecting zero-sum assumptions which drive a culture of
competition and widespread expectations of zealous advocacy among both
lawyers and clients."' "Position-taking in litigation. . . tends to reduce

7. Id. at 5-6.
8. Julie Macfarlane, Experiences of Collaborative Law: Preliminary Results from The
CollaborativeLawyering Research Project,2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 194.
9. TESLER, supra note 3, at 3.
10. Stu Webb, Collaborative Law: A Practitioner'sPerspective on its History and Current
Practice, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 155, 162 (2008).
11. Tesler, supranote 2, at 330.
12. Webb, supranote 10, at 156.
13. Id.

14. Id
15. Id.at 157.
16. Julie Macfarlane, Will Changing the Process Change the Outcome? The Relationship
Between Proceduraland Systemic Change, 65 LA. L. REV. 1487, 1489-90 (2005).
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creativity and the capacity for accommodation."07 Such position-taking
often leads to denial of allegations detrimental to one's own side, leveling of
allegations detrimental to the opposing side, concealment of information,
small concessions, and unpredictable outcomes. Within family law, the
consequences of the adversarial process can be particularly harsh, often due
to the need for ongoing relationships. Decreased trust, escalated conflict,
significant cost, and unhappiness with an outcome sometimes imposed by a
third party (judge) who knows little about the parties' family dynamics, are
often cited as the hazards of family law litigation.' 8 The "financial and
emotional costs of the family law adversarial process are more than most
families can sustain." 9 In response to this long list of adversarial
shortcomings, CL promises a different way to resolve family disputes.
Thus, it is not surprising that many family law practitioners, disheartened by
the adversarial model of litigation, would be attracted to an option that
seems to shut the courthouse doors, at least until all legal issues are settled.
In fact, the CL model has proven so attractive to many practitioners that
they tend to speak about it with an almost religious fervor. "[CL] helps
clients and attorneys evolve from their lower-functioning isolated selves into
higher-functioning integrated people."20 Pauline Tesler, who has written the
leading texts on CL, glows that "collaborative lawyers find themselves
becoming members of a healing profession-and in so doing, heal
themselves." 2 1 "When the magic [of CL] happens, the collaborative lawyers
experience a newfound freedom to work for their clients in a way that is not
possible in litigation." 22 What is startling, however, is that virtually every
description of the heightened possibilities of CL refers to benefits to the
practitioners,not the clients. Lawyers become healers, lawyers experience
new freedoms-these are examples of testimonials permeate the
collaborative law literature. 23 Tesler writes that CL creates a "rekindled joy
in the practice of law"2 4 and, over time, a "highly motivated mutual
17.

Id. at 1488.

18.

See RICHARD SHIELDS ET AL., COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW: ANOTHER WAY TO

RESOLVE FAMILY DISPUTES 17-21 (2003). In fact, decades of research has shown the damaging
effects of divorce on families. See SHERRIE R. ABNEY, AVOIDING LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO CIVIL
COLLABORATIVE LAW 119 (2006).

19.

Gary L. Voegele et al., CollaborativeLaw: A Useful Tool for the Family Law Practitioner

to Promote Better Outcomes, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 971, 979 (2007).
20. JANET P. BRUMLEY, DIVORCE WITHOUT DISASTER: COLLABORATIVE LAW IN TEXAS 9

(2004).
21.

Pauline H. Tesler, CollaborativeLaw: A New Paradigmfor Divorce Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL.

PUB. POL'Y & L. 967, 991 (1999).
22. ABNEY, supra note 18, at 229.
23. See, e.g., supranote 20 and accompanying text.
24. TESLER, supranote 3, at 5.

550

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol11/iss3/13

4

Zylstra: A Call to Action: A Client-Centered Evaluation of Collaborative L

[Vol. 11: 547, 2011]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

exploration by Collaborative lawyers of better techniques for conflict
resolution, and also to increased self-awareness of one's own skill. . . ."25
In fact, the father of CL, Stu Webb, admits that the benefits realized by
the collaborative lawyer were the impetus for developing CL. While
describing his early years of experimenting with four-way meetings without
a disqualification agreement, Webb writes that, when the case fell apart, his
relationship with the other attorney was "destroyed." 26 "That experience
was the birth of the disqualification requirement that is the sine qua non of
collaborative law!"27 These sentiments are not merely anecdotal. In Julie
Macfarlane's four year study of CL, the most frequent response to why

attorneys chose to practice CL was "abhorrence" of the litigation model.
One attorney in Macfarlane's study wrote: "In litigation, even if you got a
good legal result for the client ... at the end of it there is just depression and
ashes."29
These attorney benefits do not necessarily amount to a detriment to
clients, nor does it follow that such lawyer benefits translate into client
benefits. To be sure, CL advocates point to many potential benefits to
clients. "The collaborative process has saved time, money, and more
importantly family relationships that would have been destroyed in
litigation."30 Books and articles identify still other CL benefits, such as
teaching good communication skills, improving relationships, and enhancing
child well-being.' In fact, some authors insist that there must be some
benefit for the client. "It is the rare case that leaves the collaborative process
without any benefit to the clients .... "3 2 Some go even further, employing
25. Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, the New Lawyer, and Deep Resolution of
Divorce-Related Conflicts, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 83, 127.
26. Webb, supra note 10, at 168.
27. Id.
28.

JULIE

MACFARLANE,

CAN.

DEP'T

OF

JUSTICE,

EMERGING

PHENOMENON

OF

COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW (CFL): A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF CFL CASES 17 (2005), available
at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/fcy-fea/lib-bib/rep-rap/2005/2005 1/pdf/2005_1.pdf.
29. Id. Macfarlane adds, "Lawyers do not choose CFL [collaborative family law] simply to
offer better client service, such as lower fees, increased hours of availability or additional
services ..... Id. at 19. Thus, she cautions, "[I]t is important that lawyers promoting new processes
to their clients are open about their own reasons for preferring this approach while keeping their own
needs separate from those of their clients." Id.
30. ABNEY, supranote 18, at 34.
31. BRUMLEY, supra note 20, at 5.
32. NANCY J. CAMERON, COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE: DEEPENING THE DIALOGUE 19 (2004).
Most authors do acknowledge, however, that CL is not for all clients. Cameron and Tesler point to
clients with psychological problems, substance abuse issues, or domestic violence victims as
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the religious lingo mentioned earlier. One of the CL attorneys in
Macfarlane's study spoke about CL as "a means of saving one soul,"
referring to the client's soul. 33 The problem with such claims, as will be
discussed later, is that there are no independent studies of CL that attempt to
measure these benefits, as compared to other methods. The same author
who insists there must be some benefit to CL clients admits on the very
same page that no such studies exist. 34
A. Informed Consent
Such fervor about CL, with only anecdotal and small sample evidence
of actual benefits to clients, presents a risk of pressuring clients to choose
CL even if it is not in their best interest. In Macfarlane's study mentioned
earlier, she found this religious conversion-type language with which many
CL lawyers speak "fuels a desire to persuade their clients to use the
collaborative process." 35 And such fervor seems to extend to all cases and
clients: "Many CL lawyers promote the collaborative process to all their
Despite this advocacy, Tesler asserts that
potential family clients."3
collaborative lawyers do not "sell" collaborative law.37 "[I]t is unwise to
persuade or direct a client to choose any of the conflict-resolution
modalities, collaborative law included."3 In fact, most authors agree that
CL should not be a "hard sell."3
But can such devoted CL followers realistically avoid the hard sell? In
fact, several commentators have questioned whether true CL believers, with
a mindset that litigation is failure, can properly advise a prospective client
about the advantages and disadvantages of litigation versus CL. 40 "if
attorneys practicing collaborative law allow their own personal distaste for
litigation to cloud their judgment regarding the suitability of collaborative
potentially improper CL participants. Id. at 153-57; TESLER, supra note 3, at 25. For an extensive
evaluation of client appropriateness recommendations, see John Lande & Forrest S. Mosten,
Collaborative Lawyers' Duties to Screen the Appropriateness of Collaborative Law and Obtain
Clients' Informed Consent to Use CollaborativeLaw, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 347, 355-67
(2010).
33. Macfarlane, supra note 8, at 192.
34. CAMERON, supra note 32, at 19.
35. Macfarlane, supra note 8, at 192.
36. Id. at 210.
37. Tesler, supra note 21, at 992.
38. TESLER, supra note 3, at 56.
39. SHEILA M. GurTRMAN,
RESOLUTION 37 (2004).

COLLABORATIVE LAW: A NEW MODEL

FOR DISPUTE

40. Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A Study in
ProfessionalChange, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 289, 303-04 (2008).
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law for their clients, they may be 'selling' a dispute resolution approach to
their clients." 1 Even Tesler admits that CL practice tends to flourish among
lawyers whose "enthusiasm and conviction about [collaborative practice]
were so genuine and intense that [they simply] could not contain their
excitement when they spoke about how collaborative law works."42 Could
such ardent enthusiasm diminish the CL attorney's presentation of material
risks, as required by ABA Model Rules when entering limited representation
agreements? 43 At least one state ethics committee has identified this risk."
Even the best-intentioned, best trained collaborative lawyer may
unconsciously-and unfairly-present the risks and benefits of CL. 45 "The
danger is that a lawyer committed to the collaborative law process may lack
the capacity, even unconsciously, to provide a client with a fair
Such
representation of the risks and benefits of utilizing such a process.
for
consequences
detrimental
lead
to
unfair presentation of the risks could
the client. "[A]llegiance to a single ideological approach can deprive
practitioners and parties of a greater choice of processes, a fundamental
value of dispute system design."A
This risk of pressuring clients may be compounded by the fact that most
divorce clients are one-time, often first-time, legal consumers, with little or
no prior interactions with a lawyer. This places the attorney in a very
influential position.
Attorneys, after all, wield technical expertise, enjoy exclusive or privileged access both to
other lawyers and to officials of the state, and bring familiarity and detachment to
situations in which clients are often frightened, angry, and uninitiated. Often social status
and economic class will also give lawyers a standing to which both lawyer and client may
48
feel deference is due.

41.

Barbara Glesner Fines, Ethical Issues in Collaborative Lawyering, 21 J. AM. ACAD.

MATRIMONIAL LAW. 141, 147-48 (2008).

42.

TESLER, supranote 3, at 37.

43.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) & 1.2(c) (2010).

44. N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Op. 699 at 8-9 (2005), availableat
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/ethics/Opinion699_collablawFINAL-12022005.pdf.
45. Larry R. Spain, Collaborative Law: A Critical Reflection on Whether a Collaborative
Orientation Can Be Ethically Incorporatedinto the Practiceof Law, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 141, 161
(2004).
46. Id.
47. John Lande, The Promise and Perilsof CollaborativeLaw, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2005,
at 29, 31.
48. Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 718 (1987).
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This influence is not merely hypothetical. In William Schwab's study
of CL, he found, "The influence of lawyers also appears to figure
significantly in client decision making. Of the clients surveyed, 20% ranked
'lawyer's recommendation' as the primary factor for their choice, while
another 24% identified it as their second most important consideration."9
As will be discussed later, however, this study involved a very small sample
size.so
Beyond the danger of inappropriately "selling" CL to a client is the
danger identified in at least one case study-CL clients may not fully
comprehend the impact of the CL commitment.s'
For example,
Macfarlane's study suggests clients may not fully understand the full and
voluntary disclosure commitment requiring disclosure of information the
party never believed would be revealed, the extent to which discussions with
one's own lawyer will be kept confidential in a team model, and the
emotional and financial costs emanating from the termination of the CL
process. 2 This study also found a mismatch between the lawyer's values
and the client's practical expectations of the CL process, as clients in the
study expressed frustration regarding collaborative lawyers' reluctance to
give legal advice and not understanding the extent of information that would
be required disclosure. If the expectations of attorneys and clients are so
dissimilar, does this mark a failure to obtain informed consent? 54
Lastly, choosing CL requires a certain amount of prognosticating not
required in mediation or traditional litigation models. Because of the
disqualification agreement, both attorneys and clients must first conclude
that the settlement of their issues is best handled outside the adversarial
process, a difficult task even for the most seasoned attorney. A failed
prediction about CL has significant financial and time consequences to the
client because of the disqualification agreement, which calls into question
the client's ability to truly give informed consent. Additionally, might
attorneys be willing to risk a failed prognostication (thus, disqualification)

49. William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging Practice,4
PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 378 (2004).
50. See infra Part II.A.I.
51. Macfarlane, supra note 8, at 209.
52. Id. at 209-10.
53. Id. at 207.
54. Of course, attorney underestimations of negotiating skills are not unique to CL.
Negotiators tend to "underestimate the costs to themselves of not reaching agreement and to
overestimate the costs to the other side." ROGER FISHER ET AL., BEYOND MACHIAVELLI: TOOLS FOR
COPING WITH CONFLICT 78 (1994). Within CL this underestimation, however, could be significantly
more risky to the client than such underestimation in other family law models.
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because family law clients are usually one-time clients rather than
repeaters?55
B.

The DisqualificationAgreement

In addition to questions of informed consent, another danger to clients is
posed by the very hallmark of CL: the disqualification agreement (DA). The
DA is the single most identifiable characteristic of collaborative law.s6 CL
advocates argue that the DA, by temporarily closing the courthouse doors,
can enhance party commitment to settlement, create an environment
allowing for creative problem solving without the fear of court, and create an
equal incentive for all parties to cooperate (as both lawyers must withdraw if
one party chooses litigation). 7 The DA "truly creates the energy shift
necessary to allow all the creative resources of the parties and counsel to
focus squarely on solutions tailored for the parties."
In my view, the disqualification requirement is the engine that drives collaborative law.
The disqualification provision provides the positive settlement tone and a check on the
lawyers' mind-set and activities. Disqualification requires the lawyers to act differently.
They don't have to be concerned about trial strategies. Without the disqualification rule,
59
the behavior of the lawyer is likely to be influenced by our trial/court instincts.

Despite these claimed benefits, there are at least three potential dangers
to the client posed by the DA: client misunderstanding of the meaning and
impact of the DA, potential financial and psychological coercion of the DA,
and the diminished BATNA resulting from the signing of the DA.
1. Client Misunderstanding of the Meaning and Impact of the DA
Even if the divorcing spouse understands the meaning of the DA, which
at least one study mentioned earlier describes as highly questionable, John
Lande noted in his CL study that the client may not believe disqualification
will happen in his or her case.60 This underestimation may be fueled by the
55. See John Lande, Possibilitiesfor Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer
Disqualificationand Process Control in a New Model ofLawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1361
(2003).
56. See Webb, supra note 10, at 168.
57. Voegele et al., supra note 19, at 979.
58. GUTTERMAN, supra note 39, at 52.
59. Webb, supra note 10, at 168.
60. Lande, supra note 55, at 1358.
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zealousness of the collaborative lawyer. If disqualification does occur,
Lande suggests the client "may have difficulty appreciating in advance what
the impact would be when the agreements would be invoked.'6 Invoking
the DA requires both parties to seek and hire new lawyers and professionals,
pay new attorneys' fees, and educate new lawyers about the case.
"Collaborative law ... can require a significant investment. This investment
is no more, perhaps, than litigation costs, but if the negotiation is
unsuccessful, this investment is lost and the litigation costs remain."62
Significant time and emotional investment are also lost if CL fails.
In addition to the financial consequences of invoking the DA, clients
may find it very difficult to locate new attorneys after a failed CL attempt.
Susan Apel, in her "Skeptic's View" of CL asks, "Will non-collaborative
lawyers be lining up to litigate divorces where settlement has already proved
to be impossible?"63 Lastly, if either finding or affording a new lawyer
becomes impossible, will the failed CL client be "forced to go it alone"?6
2.

The DA's Potential Financial and Psychological Coercion to Settle

Given the significant temporal and financial consequences of the DA,
there is clearly a heightened risk of coerced settlement. Parties, mindful of
the financial consequences of disqualification, may remain at the negotiating
table even when it would no longer be in their best interest.65 In fact
Macfarlane questions whether the CL investment amounts to "entrapment
that prevents clients from withdrawing from the process."
The DA may be particularly burdensome to the party with fewer
financial resources. Although the few CL studies conducted do show that
CL is utilized almost exclusively by middle to upper income clients, there is,
still, often one party with a financial advantage in divorce. Given the
significant investment noted above, financially disadvantaged parties may be
forced to concede because of their inability to afford hiring another lawyer if
CL is unsuccessful.6 7 While there is, of course, a financial incentive to settle

6 1. Id.
62. Fines, supra note 41, at 146. In fact, at least one author questions whether invocation of
disqualification unfairly prejudices the client's rights. Spain, supranote 45, at 162.
63. Susan B. Apel, CollaborativeLaw: A Skeptic's View, 30 VT. B.J. 41 (2004).
64. Id.
65. Macfarlane, supranote 8, at 194.
66. MACFARLANE, supra note 28, at 69.
67. Apel, supra note 63, at 41. The Uniform Collaborative Law Rules and Act does permit
another lawyer in the firm to continue representation of low-income clients after a failed CL, so long
as the participation agreement includes this provision and the CL lawyer is isolated from the case
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in the traditional litigation model as well, the DA adds to that extra cost the
price of retaining and re-acquainting a new lawyer with the case, plus
additional indirect costs such as lost work, lost time, etc.
Some authors have even questioned the appropriateness of CL for any
financially disparate clients.68 At least one commentator questions whether
the DA may even violate Model Rule 1.2 in cases of financially disparate
parties:
It seems likely that in some circumstances such [disqualification] provisions are not
'reasonable under the circumstances.' For example, if retaining new counsel imposes
extremely asymmetrical costs on the two parties-one party can do it cheaply, the other
only at great expense-then these limited-retention agreements may work serious
69
strategic disadvantage on the cost-sensitive party.

Further discussion of compliance with ethics rules appears later in this
paper.70 Note, however, that Macfarlane's study did not find that CL
resulted in weaker parties "bargaining away their legal entitlements,"
although only eleven cases that reached final resolution were followed in
this study.7'
In fact, the DA itself may become an extremely powerful coercive tool,
as one party's ability to fire the other party's lawyer can mean one party's
financial ruin. "[W]hile the agreement purports to remove litigation as an
alternative, it does not. Its possibility remains a powerful threat that can be
strategically used by one party to foul the process." 72 Lande echoes this
concern. "Although the disqualification agreement is undoubtedly helpful in
many cases, it also can invite abuse by inappropriately or excessively
pressuring some parties to settle when it would be in their interest to
following the failed CL. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW R. 10 (2010); UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW

ACT (amended 2010), available at http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/archives/ulc/ucla/2010final.htm.
68.

Scott R. Peppet, The Ethics of CollaborativeLaw, 2008 J. DIsp. RESOL. 131, 157. See also

Rebecca A. Koford, Conflicted Collaborating: The Ethics of Limited Representation in
Collaborative Law, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 827, 838 (2008) (arguing CL should not be
recommended to any client who cannot afford the risk of employing a second lawyer to start the
process over). Penelope Bryan suggests that this heightened risk of coercion will fall, most often,
upon the wife in a divorce. "[T]he collaborative lawyer's incentive to settle and the clients' financial
concerns can compromise the interests of the weaker party, usually the wife." Penelope Eileen
Bryan, "CollaborativeDivorce ": Meaningful Reform or Another Quick Fix?, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL. &
L. 1001, 1015 (1999).
69. Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers'BargainingEthics, Contract,and Collaboration:The End of the
Legal Profession andthe Beginning of ProfessionalPluralism,90 IOWA L. REV. 475, 489-90 (2005).
70. See infra Part II.B.
71. MACFARLANE, supranote 28, at 78.
72. Apel, supra note 63, at 43.
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litigate."73 Lande expresses further concern that the DA may "actually
undermine some clients' interests in cooperative negotiation if the other
party will act reasonably only in response to a credible threat of
litigation . .

..

The coercion to settle within CL may not just come from the parties'
financial risk. Even with relatively equal financial resources, CL parties
may feel unique pressure from the lawyers. "Unlike any other kind of
family law representation, the risk of failure is distributed to the lawyers as
well as to the clients in collaborative law."7 While Tesler advocates this as
a benefit, it is clear that such distribution of failure creates additional
incentives for attorneys to encourage clients to stay at the negotiating table
far longer than is beneficial, especially if, as Tesler asserts, CL lawyers
believe "litigation represents a failure of both intention and imagination
because it re resents a failure to meet the objective for which the client hired
the lawyer." ' Tesler seems to acknowledge this pressure in a 2004 law
review article, although still seeing it as a benefit: "The disqualification of
all professionals from participation in litigation between these clients has the
effect of keeping both lawyers and clients at the negotiating table in the face
of apparent impasse much longer than is typically the case in conventional
As Lande has pointed out, this could
settlement negotiations .. . ."'
potentially risk a good settlement in favor of any settlement. He writes, "CL
theory calls for interest-based negotiations, but the disqualification
agreement increases the incentive to continue negotiations and reach any
agreement, not merely agreements satisfying the parties' interests."
Lastly, starting over with new lawyers after a lengthy, but failed,
attempt at CL can be "very demoralizing," which could create additional
coercion to remain at the negotiating table. Despite such concerns,
Schwab's study found that over 50% of CL participants said the DA "did not
keep them in negotiations when they otherwise would have left," although
this study involved only twenty-five client surveys.80
73. Lande, supra note 55, at 1315. Lande goes further by suggesting the DA may in fact
violate ethics rules, which the Colorado Bar Association later agreed with. Id at 1329.
74. Id. at 1360.
75. TESLER, supra note 3, at 11.
76. Id. at 16. Tesler is certainly not the only CL advocate to point to lack of settlement as
failure. "The only options in Collaborative Law are settle or fail." ABNEY, supra note 20, at 28.
77. Tesler, supra note 2, at 328.
78. Lande, supra note 55, at 1364. In fact, Macfarlane echoes his concern, especially for the
weaker party who may be "pressured to agree to an outcome that does not recognize their needs."
MACFARLANE, supra note 28, at 59.
79. Janice G. Inman, CollaborativeFamily Law Practice and You, N.Y. FAM. L. MONTHLY,
Mar. 2003, at 3.
80. Schwab, supra note 49, at 379-80.
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3. Diminishing the Client's BATNA
A final and significant concern posed by the DA is the diminishment of
a client's negotiating ability. If, as advocates claim, the purpose of CL is
interest-based negotiations in hopes of finding "common ground for
solutions," then credible analysis of CL must involve assessment of the
parties' negotiating positions within CL as compared to other forms of
family law conflict resolution. 8 ' Utilizing Fisher and Ury's seminal book in
this field, Getting to Yes, determining each party's negotiating ability
depends, in large part, upon assessment of each party's BATNA. 82 The
stronger a party's BATNA, the less likely that party will be to make a bad
agreement. "Whether you should or should not agree on something in a
negotiation depends entirely upon the attractiveness to you of the best
available alternative."84
In a typical family law case, the parties hire lawyers who attempt to
negotiate an agreement, or perhaps the parties try mediation to resolve the
issues, knowing that their BATNA is litigation, an unattractive, but
sometimes necessary, way of settling family law issues. Despite the many
disadvantages of litigation discussed in the introduction section of this paper,
with this traditional model, the parties, at least, know that their lawyers will,
if necessary, pursue litigation, having already been retained and
knowledgeable about the issues. If the parties choose CL, however, the
lawyers demand that the parties sign away this BATNA. In fact, CL is
designed to "diminish the value of both parties' BATNA in an effort to keep
them at the table."" This seems to be counterintuitive to Fisher and Ury's
argument that the best way to ensure a settlement in a party's best interest is
to improve, not diminish, one's BATNA. This diminished BATNA could
force acceptance of any settlement rather than risk loss of attorneys and
experts.
This loss of the litigation alternative is particularly onerous for family
law clients, as most of these disputes (divorce, custody, and paternity)
require court intervention. Unlike other common interpersonal conflicts,

81. Tesler, supra note 2, at 330.
82. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 97 (2d ed., Penguin Books 1991).
83. Id at 102.

84. Id. at 101.
85. Schwab, supranote 49, at 359.
86. FISHER & URY, supra note 82, at 103.
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such as landlord-tenant, employer-employee, or even neighbor-to-neighbor
disputes, most family law issues cannot be resolved without judicial
approval. Thus, litigation for family law clients is not only a BATNA, but is
really the only alternative to a negotiated agreement. If the parties cannot
reach consensus, whether through CL, mediation, or litigotiation, then
litigation becomes necessary. Thus, by signing a DA and closing the
courthouse gates, even temporarily, CL imposes a significant encumbrance
to case resolution should CL fail that is not present in many other areas of
the law. This diminished BATNA is a disadvantage in addition to the
financial, temporal, and emotional costs of the DA.
Such risks posed by the DA have caused several authors to question its
value. After concluding her research, Macfarlane asked whether the DA is
"essential to produce the cooperative characteristics" claimed by the CL
advocates. At least one commentator believes that the goals of CL could
be achieved in the family law setting with promises of good faith
negotiations combined with discovery rules, but without signing the DA."
Even if a "failed" CL is rare, as most CL practitioners suggest, these risks
ought to be explained to, understood, and meaningfully accepted by the
client prior to entering into a CL commitment.
II. AVAILABLE ANALYSES OF COLLABORATIVE LAW

A. Case Studies
Despite two decades of CL, "[t]here is as yet no empirical research that
compares client outcomes and perceptions in collaborative cases with those
in other dispute-resolution modalities."89 Examining the few available
studies of CL confirms this.
1. William Schwab published his CL study in 2004 involving surveys
of both CL clients and lawyers. While the lawyer sample included seventyone respondents, the client sample consisted of only twenty-five
respondents. 90 In the survey, lawyers were asked about CL training, the
number of CL cases handled and withdrawn, and hours spent on CL cases.9 '
Clients were asked how they learned about CL and their experiences with
87. Macfarlane, supra note 8, at 200.
88. Jennifer M. Kuhn, Working Around the Withdrawal Agreement: Statutory Evidentiary
Safeguards Negate the Need for a Withdrawal Agreement in Collaborative Law Proceedings, 30
CAMPBELL L. REv. 363, 367 (2008).
89. TESLER, supra note 3, at 8 n.20.

90.
91.

Schwab, supranote 49, at 370-71.
Id. at 369.
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CL, including cost, whether the DA affected the negotiation, and satisfaction
with the process.92
Schwab's study found 87.4% of CL cases settled, averaging 6.3 months
to reach settlement, with an average cost of $8,777 per case.93 Schwab's
small sample of clients was "white, middle-aged, well educated, and
affluent." 94 Of the clients who reached settlement in CL, 54.5% said the
disqualification provision did not keep them at the negotiating table, while
45.5% said it did,95 suggesting more than half did not find the DA coercive,
but this was a very small sample size and involved no control group.
2. Carl Michael Rossi collected data in 2004 primarily from attorneys,
in addition to a handful of coaches and financial advisors who were involved
in 160 collaborative cases. 6 His study examined client income, settlement
rates, and the cost of CL as compared to projected costs of litigation, among
other issues.97 Where client income was provided, 93% of the clients had
combined annual incomes (for the divorcing couple) over $50,000."
Approximately 85% of cases reached agreement, or the parties reconciled. 99
Of the 138 cases in which fees were provided, 50% of the cases cost the
client $10,000 or less for attorneys and all other professionals.'00 Lastly,
respondents were asked to project what the estimated cost for each client
would have been if the case had been litigated. Of the 133 responses, 68%
reported that they believed litigation would have cost the client more than
CL.'0
3. The most comprehensive study of CL, conducted by Julie
Macfarlane, involved 150 interviews conducted between 2001 and 2004
with U.S. and Canadian collaborative lawyers, collaborative clients, and

92. Id.
93. Id. at 375-77.
94. Id at 373.
95. Id. at 379.
96. Carl Michael Rossi, Collaborative Practice Case Reporting Data (2004) (on file with
author). Clients were not interviewed as part of Rossi's research.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.

561

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2011

15

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 13

other collaborative professionals.1 02 These interviews were conducted at
various stages of the case, and, although involving a significant amount of
time, included only sixteen CL cases and did not include a control or
comparison group.1
Her study found that the primary motivation for clients choosing CL
was cost and time savings, cautioning that some clients may be "bitterly
disappointed with their final bill and disillusioned by how long it has taken
for them to reach a resolution."'0 However, Macfarlane concluded, "To
date, evidence suggests that the collaborative process fosters a spirit of
openness, cooperation, and commitment to finding a solution that is
qualitatively different, at least in many cases, from conventional lawyer-tolawyer negotiations."' 0 5 But she questioned whether this is because of the
DA, the hallmark of CL, or simply because of "the need to commit to a
particular period of negotiation outside litigation, rather than an absolute
commitment not to litigate."'0o
4. David Hoffman examined 199 family law cases that his own law
firm (Boston Law Cooperative) handled between 2004 and 2007.107 The
information he collected was taken from billing records, and thus only
examined CL cost, time, and contentiousness (as estimated by lawyers or
paralegals). 0 8 Hoffman concluded that mediation cost one-third what
collaborative practice cost at his firm, but both were substantially less than
litigotiation and litigation.'0 Hoffinan found that contentiousness levels
among divorce mediation (scoring 2.5), CL (2.3), and litigotiation (2.9)
varied by only 0.6 on a scale of I (lowest contentiousness) to 5 (highest
contentiousness). "o Hoffinan concluded that the "data suggest that most of
these processes are quite similar in the measures that clients seem to care
about-i.e., cost, contentiousness, and delay.""' Note, however, that this
study involved a very narrow sample--cases from a single law firm-and
had no comparison or control group.112

102.
103.
104.

MACFARLANE, supra note 28, at 13-15.
Id.
Id at 25.

105. Macfarlane, supra note 8, at 200.
106. Id.
107. David A. Hoffman, Colliding Worlds of Dispute Resolution: Towards a Unified Field
Theory ofADR, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. I1, 27.
108. Id. at 28.
109. Id at 30-34.
110. Id at 32.
111. Id. at 34.
112. Id. at 27.
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5. Lastly, John Lande's 2007 study (published in 2008) of CL was
based on a very small number of interviews, surveys, and data collected
from cooperative lawyers at Wisconsin's Divorce Cooperation Institute."'
Cooperative law is similar to CL but does not include the DA. Lande looked
at why lawyers seek or reject CL, how cooperative practitioners view the
DA used in CL, and how CL is viewed differently from cooperative law."l 4
The cooperative lawyers surveyed expressed two sets of criticisms about
CL: that the DA is problematic, and that CL is "more cumbersome, rigid,
and expensive than necessary.""' Cooperative lawyers also pointed to the
time consuming nature of CL, particularly the overuse of four-ways.' 16
As for client concerns, 83% of those who practice cooperative law only
(not CL) "believed that a substantial number of parties in Collaborative
cases are likely to feel abandoned by their lawyers if they need to litigate
and that the Collaborative process is not appropriate for parties who cannot
afford to hire litigation attorneys if they do not reach agreement in
Half of cooperative-only attorneys felt
"
Collaborative law .... 117
"[c]ollaborative process puts too much Xressure on a substantial number of
parties, especially weaker parties..

. ."

Lande concluded "[c]ollaborative

practitioners [should] seriously consider concerns and criticisms expressed
by Cooperative practitioners.""9 Note, however, this study is also a very
small, and narrow, sample of surveys.
Each of these studies, while producing beneficial observations used in
this paper and elsewhere, lacks at least one of two criteria for effectively
evaluating CL: a sufficient sample size or scope, and control groups. By
using a small sample, or a very narrow sample (i.e., a single law firm or only
cooperative lawyers), these studies amount to no more than anecdotal
evidence. Without the use of a control group participating in some other
form of conflict resolution, particularly in studies of CL client opinions and
outcomes, it is impossible to discern which views or outcomes can be
attributed to CL independently. This is particularly important when studying
113. John Lande, Practical Insights From an Empirical Study of Cooperative Lawyers in
Wisconsin, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 203, 207.
114. Id. at 206.
115. Id. at 217.
116. Id. at 222-23.
117. Id. at 218.
118. Id.
119. Id.at207.
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family law clients, as these tend to be one-time users of the legal system,
thus having no process to compare their experience. Absent controlled
studies, professionals and clients would have great difficulty determining
whether CL is as beneficial, or more beneficial, than other methods, or
whether it is simply "a creative way for attorneys to charge their clients
more than necessary for legal matters." 20 Several CL authors have
highlighted this lack of evidence. "[T]here has been very little detailed
assessment of outcomes resulting from the use of collaborative law
processes."l 2 1 Even staunch supporters, such as Tesler, acknowledge, albeit
in a footnote, that claims of enhanced problem-solving and communication
skills, as well as other benefits espoused in the first few pages of her book,
are entirely derived anecdotally.12 However, Tesler later downplays the
significant lack of critical CL research, stating "[CL] has not been shown to
have harmed any clients and that seems to serve remarkably well the
interests of those who have chosen it." 23
Examining two of the claimed CL client benefits highlights the dangers
of advocating benefits without supporting research. In Tesler's book
Collaborative Law, the client handbook offered in the appendix assures
prospective clients that CL will cost between one-third and one-fifth the cost
of traditional litigation.124 But this claim of cost (and time) savings has yet
to be proven, as Macfarlane points out.125 Additionally, the lack of judicial
deadlines increases the length of the CL process, often leading to client
frustration. Macfarlane's study found, "With negotiations removed from
any case management requirements or constraints imposed by the court or
other parties' pretrial motions, the process sometimes slows down further
than one or both parties desire." 26 Her study also found CL client
frustration with the length of time CL takes to get to substantive issues and
with attorneys who were not willing to "hurry up" the stalling party.' 27 This
120. See Elizabeth F. Beyer, Comment, A PragmaticLook at Mediation and CollaborativeLaw
as Alternatives to Family Law Litigation, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 303, 309 (2008). Macfarlane
concluded from her sample of eleven cases that there simply did not appear to be much difference
between the outcome reached from CL and what would have been expected in litigotiation.
MACFARLANE, supra note 28, at 57.
121. Spain, supra note 45, at 154.
122. TESLER, supranote 3, at 8 n.20.
123. Id. at 147.
124. Id. at 354.
125. MACFARLANE, supra note 28, at 26. "Whether CL proves to be cheaper and faster in such
cases is still unproven." Id. Thus, Macfarlane cautions, "[Tihe CFL movement should generally be
cautious in making such [time and cost] claims and especially when using them as a basis for
obtaining consent to participate in CFL." Id.
126. Macfarlane, supra note 8, at 199.
127. Id. at 211.
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slowdown "may raise problematic legal issues in custody cases, where the
stalling party wishes to establish a pattern of custody, or in relation to the
date of a divorce agreement for the purpose of calculating assets.,, 28 At a
minimum, such frustration likely detracts from any client-perceived cost and
time savings.
A second benefit many CL advocates cite is the high settlement rates
achieved by CL-often between 85% and 90%.129 While this number is
high, the reality is that more than 90% of civil cases settle, regardless of
dispute resolution method, suggesting CL settlement success is on par with
other methods. Additionally, examining settlement rates alone can be
deceptive, as CL by definition "encourages" parties to stay at the table until
settlement is reached, or acknowledge "failure."
Consequently, CL advocates often point to the difference in settlement
quality. Tesler emphasizes that, while nearly all traditionally litigated
family law cases do settle, "those settlements generally have taken place on
the courthouse steps ... after most of the damage of litigation has
occurred[,] inflammatory court papers have been filed[,] ... positions have
polarized, clients have been encouraged to believe the black-and-white
oversimplifications of reality[,] . .. large sums of money have been spent,
and the children have been at best forgotten . . . ."13 Thus, courthouse-step

settlements are often viewed as being limited in scope and creativity because
of court rules, deadlines, and unaddressed emotional issues.13' While these
observations are likely true, this does not necessarily prove that CL
agreements encompass scope, creativity, and emotional acknowledgement,
at least not without proper study.
B. EthicalAnalyses of CollaborativeLaw

In addition to the lack of empirical CL studies discussed above, there is
also concern regarding the other common method used to evaluate CLcomparing CL to state or model ethics rules. At least nine state ethics
committees have addressed CL in published opinions, with all but one
finding that CL complies with lawyer ethics rules.132 In 2007, the Colorado
128.
129.

Id. at 199.
CAMERON, supra note 32, at 18.

130.

TESLER, supra note 3, at 1.

131. See Tesler, supra note 2, at 326-28.
132. ABA, Section of Dispute Resolution, Summary of Ethics Rules Governing Collaborative
at
available
2009),
(Draft
Practice
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Bar Association's Ethics Committee found the DA violates the state ethics
rules and found the conflict of interest created by it cannot be waived by the
client.' 3 This opinion was quickly followed by an ABA opinion rejecting
Colorado's decision and fully supporting CL.13 Colorado has remained in
the minority regarding CL.
The remaining eight opinions, however, appear to fall short of a clientcentered ethical analysis. The states evaluated CL against lawyer behavior
and ethics, such as analyses of zealous advocacy, confidentiality, duty to
communicate, duty to disclose, and attorney withdrawal, rather than
evaluating the ethical efficacy of CL for clients.' 5 For example, Kentucky
and Pennsylvania, among others, both address attorney withdrawal only as it
comports with the ethics rule for withdrawal, without any discussion of the
harsh consequences to the client that CL withdrawal poses, as compared to
traditional attorney-client agreements.136 New Jersey's opinion analyzes the
ability of one CL client to discharge the spouse's attorney, a phenomenon
not present in any other legal model, and has the potential to financially
devastate one spouse. 37 Despite this ethical quandary, the opinion merely
notes the "considerable hardship" this may impose, but quickly dismisses it
on the grounds that the parties understood this "at the outset of the
representation," thus it is acceptable.' 3 8
To be sure, some of the ethics opinions (outside of the Colorado
decision) have addressed issues pointed out in this paper, such as the harsh
circumstances of disqualification, with at least one state finding that CL
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/DR035000/sitesofinterest-files/EthicsPaper(200
9101 0).pdf.
at
(2007),
available
Op.
115
Ethics
Comm.,
Bar
Ass'n
133. Colo.
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/386/sublD/10159/Ethics-Opinion-l 15:-Ethical-Considerationsin-the-Collaborative-and-Cooperative-Law-Contexts,-02/24.
134. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 447 (2007) (ethical
at
available
practice),
law
collaborative
in
considerations
http://www.collaborativelawny.com/assets/news/07-447%2ONews.pdf.
135. See Christopher M. Fairman, Growing Pains: Changes in Collaborative Law and the
Challenge of Legal Ethics, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 237 (2008). This lawyer-centered analysis
extends to the literature as well. Tesler's book spends one chapter addressing ethical issues
presented by CL by examining state statutes, various ethics provisions, practice group protocols, and
malpractice insurance. TESLER, supra note 3, at 159-71. Sheila M. Gutterman also devotes one
chapter of her CL book to ethical issues, but focuses almost exclusively on state lawyer ethics rules.
See also GuTrERMAN, supranote 39, at 59-76.
at
available
E-425
(2005),
Op.
Ky.
Bar
Ass'n,
136. See
http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics-opinions/kba e-425.pdf; see also Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Legal Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Informal Op. 2004-24 (2004), available at
http://www.collaborativelaw.us/articles/EthicsOpinionPennCL_2004.pdf.
137. Lande, supra note 55, at 1354.
138. N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Op. 699 at 5-6 (2005), availableat
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/ethics/Opinion699_collablawFINAL_12022005.pdf.
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would not be reasonable if the lawyer believes there is a strong likelihood of
impasse.' 39 Additionally, many of these opinions also stress the need for
informed consent, but often finding only that the attorney must ensure the
client fully understands the risks (which has already been shown earlier in
this paper to be problematic).140 Some opinions also address the tension
between the CL attorney's desire to continue negotiation out of fear of
disqualification and a client's desire to pursue litigation, but again, seem to
only give superficial cautions against such actions.
Such cursory analysis of potentially severe consequences seems unfair
to prospective clients. Granted, one may argue that the job of ethics
committees is solely to evaluate a lawyer's inquiry against a state ethics rule,
thus, perhaps the ethics committees are not the appropriate targets at which
to aim. 142 However, should these opinions be the end of an ethical
evaluation of CL? Lande observed in his 2003 article, "Even if courts and
ethics committees do not determine that the disqualification agreement
violates ethical rules, its operation raises serious concerns about the nature
and effects of CL practice." 43 For example, Ted Schneyer suggests now
that most states that have considered CL have found it to be in compliance
with lawyer ethics rules:
The key ethical questions for collaborative law will presumably shift to (1) how much
information a collaborative lawyer must communicate to a prospective client about CL's
risks and advantages compared to the alternatives in order to obtain informed consent; (2)
how thoroughly the lawyer must screen prospective clients to determine in each case
whether CL would be a reasonable option; and (3) when a prospective client's

139. Id. at 7.
at
available
(2005),
E-425
Op.
Bar
Ass'n,
Ky.
e.g.,
140. See,
http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics opinions/kba-e-425.pdf; N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof'l
at
available
(2005),
699
Op.
Ethics,
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/ethics/Opinion699 collablawFINAL 12022005.pdf;
Advisory Comm. of the Supreme Court of Mo., Formal Op. 124 (2008), available at
http://www.collaborativelaw.us/articles/FO 124%20(CollaborativeLaw).pdf.
141. See, e.g., Advisory Comm. of the Supreme Court of Mo., Formal Op. 124 (2008),
availableat http://www.collaborativelaw.us/articles/FO_124%20(Collaborative-Law).pdf.
142. N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Op. 699 at 8 (2005), availableat
Note,
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/ethics/Opinion699-collablawFINAL_12022005.pdf.
however, New Jersey's opinion is perhaps most inclusive in its consideration of tangential ethical
issues, such as cautioning against the use of CL with parties whose relationship is "irretrievably
beyond repair." Id.
143. Lande, supra note 55, at 1329. These broader public ethics issues surrounding CL are
discussed in two paragraphs (mostly consisting of questions) of Cameron's book, Collaborative
Practice. CAMERON, supra note 32, at 234-35.
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circumstances are so unfavorable that it would be unethical to accept him as a CL
client.144

Many other ethical questions also remain unanswered. For example,
what if a client uses CL as a means to manipulate the other party, as a delay
tactic, or as discovery because of the mandatory disclosure rules? Tesler
cautions that lawyers must ensure prospective clients are not using the
process in this way, but how is that possible before the process begins
(except perhaps in extreme cases where the prospective client announces his
or her intentions)?14 5 How can a CL attorney avoid the inherent conflict of
interest created by four-way CL agreements?l 46 What are the ramifications
of using CL in cases of severe power imbalance?l 47 A small Canadian
study, involving only eight clients and twelve attorneys, examined the role
of CL in creating or alleviating power imbalances judged by client
involvement.148 The authors of that study later concluded that CL may
actually alleviate power imbalances resulting from gender inequalities such
as spousal abuse, disproportionate child-care responsibilities, and lower
earning potentials, but even this study comes with many caveats.14 9 Will a
failed CL disproportionately affect women and children?5 o How can a
withdrawing attorney comply both with the promise not to divulge
information revealed during CL and with the requirement that withdrawal
not materially affect the client (by failing to provide important information
to litigation counsel)?' 5 ' Macfarlane's study points to even more potential
ethical dilemmas ripe for further study in virtually every area of the research

144. Schneyer, supra note 40, at 315.
145. TESLER, supranote 3, at 144.
146. Gary M. Young, MalpracticeRisks of CollaborativeDivorce, 75 WIs. LAW. 14 (2002). In
fact, Young refers to this as a "fatal ethical flaw." Id.
147. Susan M. Buckholz, Two Views on CollaborativeLaw: Collaborative Dissolution,30 VT.
B.J. 37, 38 (2004). For example, Lande points to the potential for CL to cause further abuse to
domestic violence victims by creating an additional barrier to the legal system. Lande, supra note
113, at 264. "Moreover, if an abused client's safity is threatened during the course of negotiations, he or she
may be unable to obtain a restraining order without simultaneously losing the services of his or her lawyer."
Wanda Wiegers & Michaela Keet, CollaborativeFamilyLaw and Gender Inequalities:BalancingRisks
and Opportunities,46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 733, 766 (2008).
148. Michaela Keet, Wanda Wiegers & Melanie Morrison, Client Engagement Inside
Collaborative Law, 24 CAN. J. FAM. L. 145, 174 (2008). The authors concluded that "not all cases
involving significant power imbalances would be inappropriate [for CL]." Id However, they also
found that the DA presented unique settlement pressure for the weaker party. Id.
149. Wiegers&Keetsupra note 147, at 772.
150. Bryan, supra note 68, at 1002-03. Her fear is that unqualified, even gender-biased lawyers
will influence female clients to take a bad deal. Id. Because "emotions and relationships" are
focused on more than substantive (financial) issues, women will be far more likely to "relinquish
financial interests in order to preserve relationships." Id at 1013-14.
151. Spain, supra note 45, at 164-65.
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report.152 Still other authors have raised additional ethical and legal
questions about CL.153
Ultimately, some commentators question whether CL should be offered
as a dispute resolution model given insufficient answers to some of these
questions.15 4 In fact, at least one law professor goes further in questioning
CL, asking whether CL itself is ethical given the requirement that a client
"give advance consent to withdrawal, garticularly when it may be materially
adverse to the interests of the client."'
Aside from the many unanswered ethical questions posed by CL, a
second, perhaps more alarming, concern is found in Macfarlane's study,
which found CL lawyers almost universally could not think of a single
ethical concern arising out of CL. 56 As mentioned earlier, Macfarlane's
study showed clients often did not understand the ramifications of the CL
commitment, such as disclosure issues and disqualification, as well as a
mismatch between client and lawyer expectations of the CL process.'57
Despite the ethical issues identified by clients, and the many others
mentioned here, "[o]utside a small group of experienced practitioners, the
study has found little explicit acknowledgement and recognition of ethical
issues among CL lawyers."'5 8 When CL attorneys were asked to give
examples of ethical issues that arose during the CL process ("anything that
might raise a difficult choice or decision over the 'right' thing to do under
the circumstances"), Macfarlane found "few examples were forthcoming"
and even those were "perfunctory" or "mechanistic."l 5 9 "Perhaps more
significant is the number of CL lawyers who respond to this line of [ethics]
inquiry by stating that they do not anticipate any potential ethical

152. MACFARLANE, supra note 28,passim.
153. As for the CL agreement, at least one author questions whether the parties believe that the
four-way documents are legally binding. Peppet, supra note 68, at 137-38. If it is legally binding,
could an unhappy CL client sue the attorney over the DA on contract grounds, such as fraud or
mistake? Voegele et al., supra note 19, at 1021.
154. "It may well introduce a model of practice that is ill-defined and without sufficient
safeguards to both attorneys and clients. There is the potential for uncertainty as to the proper and
appropriate role for the collaborative lawyer and the danger of overstepping professional
boundaries." Spain, supra note 45, at 154.
155. Id. at 163. At least one critic rejects CL completely "as a viable process for dispute
resolution." Apel, supranote 63, at 41.
156. Macfarlane, supra note 8, at 208.
157. Id. at 207, 209-10.
158. Id. at 208.
159. MACFARLANE, supra note 28, at 63-64.
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dilemmas."60 These findings are the most disturbing of the study,
indicating, not only a mismatch of attorney-client expectations, but actual
ignorance of ethical dilemmas by the very practitioners of CL.,6 1 Such
findings clearly dictate a need for extensive CL lawyer training, or perhaps,
re-training.
III. CONCLUSION
As stated in the introduction, my goal with this inquiry is not to dismiss
CL as unethical or detrimental to clients. Rather, the current CL literature
and studies suggest, at least, that widespread advocacy of this process may
be premature. The question of informed consent raises the first red flag of
caution, not just because of CL devotees potentially shielding clients from a
thorough risk analysis, but because at least one study found that clients often
do not fully understand the risks of CL.162 The misunderstanding extends,
not just to the process of CL, but to the consequences of the DA. Even with
complete understanding, the DA poses additional concerns regarding
pressure to settle not present in other forms of dispute resolution. The
diminished BATNA created by CL should be the subject of further research
to determine whether this risk affects client participation or case outcomes.
Finally, the lack of comprehensive, controlled studies of CL to assess
actual costs, risks, and benefits is significant, but also easily resolved given
the twenty years of CL case history and the rising number of collaborative
practitioners. Studies are needed, not just comparing CL to other family law
models, but also seeking client-centered answers to the practical and ethical
concerns expressed here and elsewhere.'63 Macfarlane's study is by far the
most comprehensive CL inquiry to date, but more needs to be done. Such
studies are needed to confirm or disprove CL claims beyond the stated
attorney benefits and should identify whether those benefits are symbolic,
psychological, or outcome-based. Perhaps most importantly, studies are
needed to determine whether those benefits are desirable and important to
clients.

160. Id. at 64.
161. Lande observes there may be reasons for the lack of acknowledgement of CL risks. John
Lande, The Top Ten Reasons CollaborativePractitionersGivefor Not Acknowledging
Risks of Collaborative Practice (Particularly the Disqualification Agreement) (2009),
http://www.law.missouri.edulande/publications/Lande%20Top%2Ten%20Reasons%20of%/2OCP
%20Practitioners.pdf.
162. Macfarlane, supra note 8, at 209-10.
163. One author believes that such studies will likely reveal that CL's benefits are similar to
mediation, which raises the question whether CL is "perhaps only a more expensive, longer, and less
efficient process than the average mediated lawsuit. . . ." Beyer, supra note 120, at 308.
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